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Historic Preservation and the Law:
Appraisals of Realty for Taxation
EUGENE J. MORRIS*
The United States Supreme Court decision in Penn Cen-
tral' will lead to a burgeoning of the historic preservation move-
ment in the United States. Prior to that definitive ruling sanc-
tioning the preservation concept, most jurisdictions treaded
warily in the area, and most landmark designations involved
nonprofit and government owned properties, with preservation
agencies shying away, as much as possible, from designating pri-
vately owned structures. Now, the preservation movement will
strike out more boldly and will begin to encompass, on a much
wider scale, private property operated for profit. This change
will give rise to new legal problems involving the courts, the leg-
islatures, and the administrative arms of government. One prob-
lem that has been largely ignored must be confronted: how
should privately owned property be assessed for local real prop-
erty tax purposes when the property has been designated for
landmark or historic district preservation? For the purposes of
this article, assume the applicability of the New York City
Landmarks Preservation Law,2 the Real Property Tax Law of
the State of New York,3 and the New York City Tax Review
Procedures4 even though laws regarding landmarks, historic dis-
tricts, and tax assessment differ in various states and municipal-
ities throughout the country.
The problem of tax assessment of properties designated for
landmark or historic district preservation does not exist where
property is owned by the government or by religious, eleemosy-
nary, educational, or other nonprofit, tax exempt owners. St.
Patrick's Cathedral is on one of the most valuable blocks in the
world, but it has no problem with respect to its real estate tax
assessment.
Where taxable private property is designated, however, the
following major considerations are presented: first, as long as the
privately owned property is economically viable and its present
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use is the equivalent of its highest and best use, the designation
of it for historic preservation presents no hardship because the
use may continue undisturbed by the designation since the
property is capable of remaining economically competitive; sec-
ond, when the landmark or historic district designation enhances
the value of the structure by virtue of added prestige, no hard-
ship is presented; but, third, if values in the area, as well as
taxes, are increasing and the land could be redeveloped at a bet-
ter "highest and best use" without the designation, the owner
may encounter economic hardship as a result.
In this last situation, the owner may be able to resort to
financial assistance supplied pursuant to relevant landmarks
laws. Subsidy may be provided privately, by foundations, or by a
government to maintain the property in its proper state for his-
toric preservation. A good illustration is the former Astor Li-
brary on Lafayette Street in Manhattan which is now operated
by Joseph Papp as The Public Theatres;6 Furthermore, an own-
er may seek to transfer the air rights from his property. While
relatively few cities have adopted this concept, transferable de-
velopment rights may be sold and the payment for these rights
may be sufficient to maintain the property. Financial aid may
also be granted through a tax exemption or abatement to help
preserve the property. Alternately, a government may resort to
eminent domain, requiring the payment of just compensation for
the taking. This approach is rarely resorted to because of the
high cost involved. If all of the above fail, then permission must
be given, after the lapse of the statutory period of time, to de-
molish the landmark or to make such other changes as are nec-
essary to provide a fair return from the property. This provision
is necessary to preserve the constitutionality of the statute.
The problems of taxing full value are well illustrated by ref-
erence to the landmark building in which this conference is be-
ing held, the home of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York. The dues for membership have risen sharply because
the building is no longer tax exempt and taxes must be paid in
full. If the dues exceed the ability of the members to pay, the
only alternative would be to allow the property to be demol-
ished; that is really the bottom line of the whole landmarks pro-
cedure and of the interrelationship of tax assessment and prop-




on the property bear a direct and important relationship to abil-
ity to operate the property economically, the valuation for tax
purposes becomes a crucial factor in the historic preservation
syndrome. It is essential to understand the procedures and tech-
niques available to deal with the valuation of historic property
for tax purposes.
This paper will outline the conventional method of valua-
tion of real property for tax purposes and the modification of
these techniques to reflect the impact of landmark or historic
district designation.
Assessment of each parcel of real property in a tax district
is made each year by an assessor or a Board of Assessors and
these valuations are placed on the public tax rolls on the taxable
status date each year. Even though all properties are required
to be assessed in most states on the basis of full value or fair
market value,8 assessing properties at full value has always cre-
ated difficulty. The factors of politics, subjective evaluations,
and other deleterious elements have encroached upon the full
value concept so that only rarely do assessments prevail at full
value for all properties in a tax district. This problem is being
dealt with as a result of the Hellerstein decision in New York8
and similar decisions in many other jurisdictions throughout the
country.
Ordinarily, in fixing an assessment, the land is valued first,
usually based on comparable sales and leases where available or
by use of the land residual method. The latter involves the de-
velopment of a hypothetical "highest and best use" improve-
ment, the capitalization of its net income to arrive at a total
value, and the deduction of the cost of the hypothetical im-
provement, with the remainder representing the land value.
There are three methods: comparable sales and leases, capitali-
zation of net income, and reproduction costs less depreciation
and obsolescence. Comparable sales and leases in appropriate
cases is used most frequently. Under New York tax assessment
procedure and in most other jurisdictions, the assessor must as-
sess the land as if unimproved and then add the value of the
improvement to make up the total.
The most important aspect of property valuation is rooted
in two concepts: 1) highest and best use, and 2) capitalization of




how the property is capable of being developed as a result of
zoning, the infra-structure, the nature of the community and all
the complex factors that go into the totality of real estate devel-
opment, in short, it involves a determination as to the best way
to improve the land, obviously, always a subjective procedure.
The concept of capitalization of net income requires an esti-
mate of the income that could be realized from the highest and
best use of the property. Net income is determined by sub-
tracting from the income the normal operating expenses, which
are usually based on the operating expenses of comparable
properties and do not include depreciation, mortgages, or liens.
The resulting net income is then capitalized at a rate deter-
mined by an estimate of what return should be expected by an
investment in this type of property based on market returns for
comparable investments. Ten or twenty years ago, we capitalized
at 5 percent for the land, 6 percent for the building. Today, the
capitalization rates usually average above 10 percent. Deprecia-
tion and real estate taxes may be deducted as expenses or may
be built into the capitalization rate.
If it can be shown that a property is assessed in excess of its
full or fair market value, the assessment will be reduced either
on protest 0 or in a tax review proceeding in court.1
Properties must be assessed equally. Thus, when it can be
established that a particular property is assessed at a higher per-
centage of full value than other properties on the same tax roll,
the owner is entitled to a reduction (even if his property is as-
sessed at less than full value) on the ground of inequality. In
New York, the State Board of Equalization and Assessments
fixes an equalization rate for each tax district for each year.
That rate is prima facie evidence of the rate of assessment for
that district unless the contrary is proven at trial.1 2
If there is any violation of the statutory procedure for the
fixing of assessed value, the assessment may be challenged upon
a claim of illegality.13 This basis is rarely used.
Assessors have the duty of fixing the assessment for each
property in the district each year sometime before the tax as-
sessment date (the taxable status date). The assessor is required
to fix a value for the land as if unimproved and then a total
value for the land and improvements. Any information that





After the tentative assessment is fixed by the assessor and is
published on the tax rolls, the taxpayer may object to the assess-
ment on "grievance day" or during a "protest period." After any
adjustment has been made and after the final assessment has
been fixed, the taxpayer has a limited period of time within
which to institute a court proceeding to review the correctness of
the assessment. If the issue cannot be resolved by settlement, a
trial will ensue on whatever ground of claimed invalidity the
taxpayer has asserted, i.e., overvaluation, inequality, or illegality.
Appeals, of course, may follow. The determination of the court
governs the assessment for the year or years in question, but is
not binding upon assessments for subsequent years."'
Proof of overvaluation is usually adduced through expert
testimony. Each side produces its own experts, who testify, using
the conventional techniques for appraising real property, as to
the fair market value or full value of the property on the taxable
status date (or dates, if there is more than one year under re-
view). The techniques include consideration of comparable sales
or leases,1 capitalization of net income," reproduction cost less
depreciation and obsolescence," and other factors relevant to
the particular property.
Where the equalization rate of the State Board of Equaliza-
tion and Assessment is accepted by all parties, it is multiplied
by the fair market value or full value to produce the equalized
assessment. Where the parties do not concede the correctness of
the equalization rate, sample parcels in the tax district are se-
lected, either by stipulation or by direction of the court, and are
valued. These values are then compared with their assessments
and a ratio is established which is extrapolated into an equaliza-
tion rate fixed by the court after hearing the proof on both sides.
This factor is then multiplied by the full value to fix the
assessment.18
Proof is adduced as to the claimed illegality, and the court
must determine the issue as a matter of law; this basis for chal-
lenging assessments is rarely used.
In applying the procedures described above to the problem
of assessing a privately owned property which has been desig-
nated for historic preservation, we are confronted with the ne-




value on the total based on highest and best use of the parcel.
When a landmark consisting of an inadequate improvement is
involved, the owner cannot realize the highest and best use of
the land. It would seem, therefore, inequitable to tax the land up
to the full value of the highest and best use. If that were to be
done, the government would be barring a use and at the same
time taxing as if the use were available. Yet the mandate of the
taxing statute is to value the land as if unimproved, 19 and it may
be legally inappropriate to modify that value because of the na-
ture of the improvement. That is our Catch 22.
The difficulty may best be illustrated by hypothesizing that
the Flatiron Building, a landmark located on 23rd Street and
Fifth Avenue, were to be located instead at 57th Street and Park
or Fifth Avenue. In its present location, it is unlikely that its site
could be readily redeveloped into a higher and better use. Con-
sequently, a designation requiring preservation of the building's
exterior would have little significance in economic terms, except
possibly, to enhance its value slightly by virtue of the prestige
flowing from its designation as a landmark. At 57th Street and
Park or Fifth Avenue, the building would be inadequate to real-
ize the earning potential for the area. A land assessment based
on 57th Street land-values could create a double penalty on the
owner who, while unable to employ the full potential of the land,
would have to pay taxes as if he could.
On the other hand, it might violate the statute to assess the
land at less than its full value solely because of the impediment
to the highest and best use created by the historic preservation
restriction. To assess at less than full value could result in the
anomalous situation of one parcel's being assessed at $100 per
square foot and an adjacent parcel, worth the same amount, be-
ing assessed at $500 per square foot because of the landmark
designation of the first parcel.
The elimination of the requirement of the statute for a sep-
arate assessment of land, as if unimproved, might resolve this
dilemma. Since there does not seem to be any reason for the
separation of land and total assessment, because taxes are only
paid on the total assessment, the change may be desirable.
Another difficulty may arise as a result of a landmark desig-
nation of a privately owned property that does not fully employ




the transfer or sale of the development rights (TDR) is permit-
ted, as in New York20 or Chicago,21 the sums realized from a sale
might contribute to the feasibility of maintaining the landmark.
However, where the TDR is not permitted, the owner is de-
prived by the landmarks restriction of the use of these excessive
zoning rights and yet is required to pay real estate taxes based
upon the value of these rights under conventional land assess-
ment practices. This dilemma was not resolved in the Penn Cen-
tral case, even though TDR was considered,2 because the sub-
ject was dealt with in a different context. New York remains one
of the few places in the country where the transfer of develop-
ment rights is permitted. Eight or nine years ago, John Costonis
suggested the possibility of placing the development rights into
a development bank and then permitting them to be allocated
elsewhere or sold, to be appropriately used without violating the
basic zoning applicable to the district.2"
It has recently been suggested as a means of preserving
landmarks that the federal Urban Development Action Grant
(UDAG) funds might be used to purchase development rights
and hold them in a development bank until they can be appro-
priately used.
Where designation enhances the value of the property, the
assessor faces the question of whether to add an increment of
value to the assessment because of the landmark's designation.
These dilemmas are typical of the problems which face as-
sessors, owners, legislators, and the courts as historic preserva-
tion doctrine expands in the future under the umbrella of the
Penn Central case in much the same manner as zoning doctrine
developed, beginning 50 years ago in the wake of Village of Eu-
clid v. Ambler.2 The problem has many of the same elements as
other situations that have arisen in the past where there has
been distortion of the normal elements of real property valua-
tion such as rent control, the depressed value of property during
the 1930s, the continuance of nonconforming zoning uses and
aesthetic or architectural values. Since courts and legislators
have evolved acceptable solutions to these seemingly intractable
problems, it seems assured that solutions will also be reached as
to the problems of assessing properties designated in historic
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